

The Near East and North Africa

~~Communist capabilities lie in Syria, and Israel, or among Palestinian Arabs~~  
 The present pro-Soviet trend in Syria, the reported presence of Soviet military experts and technicians in Syria and the consequent improvement in the status of the Syrian CP constitute the greatest sources of threats of sabotage for the neighboring states of ~~Jordan~~ Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Communists of these areas will probably continue to commit acts of terrorist nature as operatives of non-Communist agencies or groups. Particularly dangerous ~~exist~~ threat is the extensive infiltration of Communists into the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau and other ~~subordinate~~ units or subordinate institutions of the Syrian Army.

The existence of exploitable issues--such as the ~~impoverished~~ aspirations and ~~poor~~ ~~and~~ ~~com~~ plight of Palestinian refugees in ~~Jordan~~ ~~Yarmuk~~ Jordan--contributes to the continuous nature of the threat. Communist and pro-Communist elements among the refugees ~~exist~~ constitute a source of personnel for Communist sabotage missions and training programs. These men are trained in Syria and are clandestinely returned to Jordan. In a moment of economic or political crisis a coordinated, widespread sabotage campaign conceivably could occur in the states adjacent to Syria.

In Egypt, the threat of Communist sabotage is presently slight in view of Nasr's ~~neutralist~~ <sup>anti-West</sup> policy--a policy which ~~is~~ <sup>now</sup> Soviet ends. <sup>(for the foreseeable future is likely to the direct action of</sup> [mechanism]?

In view of the disrupted status of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the greatest threat of sabotage in this area would come from a Soviet <sup>intelligence</sup> ~~intelligence~~ <sup>agent</sup>. The ~~Tudeh~~ <sup>will</sup> probably ~~not~~ <sup>would</sup> initiate such action unless an outbreak <sup>war</sup> ~~war~~ imminent. ~~exists there a threat to the Soviet Communist~~

In Ceylon, <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ in mid-1957 although there <sup>is</sup> evidence of organizational and material preparation for ~~an~~ eventual <sup>violent</sup> ~~sabotage~~ action, this will probably not be undertaken in the near future in view of the CP's present policy to support the government. The Moscow-oriented <sup>Communist Party of Ceylon</sup> probably ~~has~~ broader popular support and a greater ability to <sup>dominate</sup> ~~coerce~~ and ~~control~~ the other Communist parties of Ceylon before initiating aggressive action. In other Near and Middle Eastern areas the CP's are too weak to <sup>carry out</sup> ~~initiate~~ <sup>acts</sup> anything but isolated ~~cases~~ of industrial or other sabotage.

## (in Egypt, Libya, and Morocco)

~~Probable~~ It is possible however that demonstrations and violence directed against US installations might be generated & exploited in the event of a significant increase in US-Egyptian dissension. Provocative acts of violence which can

Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030108-0 (Part A/p.1)  
 solid or if Egypt showed signs of seeking a rapprochement with the West.

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

Covert ~~sections~~ of the Algerian CP and Communist fractions  
~~Algerian communists~~  
within the ~~CNA~~ will probably continue to provide support for the FLN  
by organizing and executing sabotage, by acquiring or preparing explosives  
for the FLN and other ~~form~~ similar forms of aid. P The Communist-led  
nationalist movement in the Cameroons, the Union des Populations  
Cameroons (UPC), will probably continue its ~~a~~ terrorist campaign to  
weaken the French colonial authorities and to try to gain control over  
the ~~entire~~ nationalist movement.

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~